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Assessment of the Orbiter Main Propulsion System FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE S_Y
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA)of the
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List
(CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE Projects
Office to perform the hardware analysis using the instructions and
ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation
of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main
Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes
and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell
Downey/NASA JSC (henceforth referred to as RI/NASA) FMEA/CIL
review. (This review is still in progress as of this writing.)
Data available to IOA as of 1 January 1988 was used.
For the mechanical component analysis, this included: (i) The RI/
NASA Critical Items List of 23 December 1987, (2) substantially
complete (but still subject to revision) CIL worksheets for the
Feed and Fill/Drain Subsystems, and (3) RI/NASA FMEA/CIL review
meeting notes specifying revisions to the pre-51L FMEA/CIL
document. These notes were acquired from J. E.Borches/Lockheed
in July 1987.
Available data for the EPD&C analysis included substantially
complete CIL worksheets for some EPD&C components (Feed and
Fill/Drain) and the MPS/EPDC FMEA Review Summary of 18 August
1987. The Review Summary gives no supporting information, only
criticalities and screens. All of this data was still subject
to change at the time this assessment began.
IOA Assessment sheets (Appendix C) indicate the source of the
RI/NASA work that was assessed. Where no source is given, an
RI/NASA CIL worksheet was used.
Due to severe budget and schedule constraints, the resolution of
differences between the RI/NASA results and IOA was not possible.
An overview of the IOA MPS Assessment results is given in Figure 1.
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The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress safety
policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National Space
Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has undertaken the
task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space Shuttle design.
The MDAC is providing an independent assessment of the proposed
Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utilizing
as-available drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem into
components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item is
evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These data
are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,and
are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is














Define subsystem analysis diagram
Define subsystem
Define major assemblies





Construct matrix of failure modes











Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined to
provide necessary additions and clarifications to the ground
rules and assumptions contained in NSTS 22206.
4
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Orbiter Main Propulsion System is composed of the Propellant
Management Subsystem (PMS) consisting of the LO 2 and LH 2 subsystems
and the Helium Subsystem (Figures 2A thru 2D). The PMS is a system
of manifolds, distribution lines, and valves by which the liquid
propellants pass from the ET to the SSMEs. Some of the propellants
are vaporized in the engine and returned to the ET to maintain
ullage pressure. The Helium Subsystem consists of a series of
helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, check valves,
distribution lines, and control valves. The Helium Subsystem
supplies helium that is used within the SSMEs for in-flight purges
and provides pressure for actuating SSME valves during emergency
pneumatic shutdowns. The balance of the helium is used to provide
pressure to actuate all the pneumatically operated valves within
the PMS.
3.1.1 Propellant Management Subsystem Function
During engine burn, propellants under tank pressure flow from the
ET to the Orbiter through two umbilicals; one for LO 2 and the
other for LH 2 (Figures 3 and 4, respectively).
The PMS also provides a path which allows gases tapped from the
three engines to flow back to the ET, through two gas umbilicals,
to maintain pressures in the fuel and oxidizer tanks.
The PMS also functions during phases other than engine burn.
During prelaunch, the PMS is used to control the loading of
propellants in the ET. During orbit, PMS controls propellant
dump, vacuum inerting, and system repressurization (for entry).
3.1.2 The PMS Components
The PMS contains the following major components (Figures 3 and 4).
A, Liquid Propellant Supply and Distribution Network.
The network is composed of all the liquid propellant
lines used to load propellants during prelaunch, feed
propellants to the SSMEs during engine burn, and dump
residual propellants after ET separation. Specifically,
the network consists of:
I. Propellant Feedline Manifolds - There are two 17-
inch diameter manifolds in the Orbiter, one for LO 2
and one for LH 2. Both of the manifolds have a
feedline disconnect valve at one end and two fill
and drain valves (one inboard, one outboard)
connected in series at the other end. The feedline
manifolds connect to the ET liquid propellant
umbilicals at the feedline disconnect valve, and to
either GSE liquid propellant umbilicals (prelaunch
only), or overboard at the outboard fill and drain
valves.
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Figure 4 - PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM FUEL FLOW
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Between the feedline disconnect valves and the in-
board fill and drain valves are three outlets for
the three engine propellant feedlines and 1 outlet
for the propellant feedline relief line. The LH 2
feedline manifold contains an extra outlet for the
LH 2 Return to Launch Site (RTLS) feedline dump line.
(See paragraph 4 below.) Pressures within the LO 2
and the LH 2 feedline manifolds (MANF) can be
monitored on the two ENG MANF meters on Panel F7 or
the CRT display Guidance and Navigation Control
(GNC) System (SYS) SUMM 1 Backup Flight System
(BFS).
Engine Propellant Feedlines - There are 6 12-inch
diameter feedlines in the Orbiter, 3 for LO 2 and
3 for LH 2. Each of the LO 2 engine propellant feed-
lines connects to the LO 2 feedline manifold at one
end and to the Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
(LPOT) inlet of one of the SSMEs at the other end.
Likewise, each of the LH engine propellant
feedlines connects to th_ LH 2 feedline manifold
at one end and to the Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump
(LPFT) inlet at one of the SSMEs at the other end.
There is one prevalve in each of the six engine
propellant feedlines. The prevalves are designated
as left, center, or right (engine) LO 2 prevalve;
or left, center, or right (engine) LH 2 prevalve.
Propellant Feedline Relief Line - There are 2
1-inch diameter relief lines in the Orbiter, 1 for
LO 2 and 1 for LH 2. Each relief line connects to 1
of the propellan£ feedline manifolds at 1 end and
to an overboard port at the other end. Each relief
line contains a relief valve and a pneumatically
actuated relief isolation valve. The isolation
valve is mounted in series with, and up-stream of,
the relief valve. Flow through the relief line
and relief valve is enabled by relieving closing
pressure on the normally open isolation valve,
allowing it to open.
The position of the relief isolation valve (2)
is controlled by one of two FEEDLINE RLF ISOL
switches on Panel R4. Normally these switches
are left in the GPC position. With the switches
(2) in this position, both relief isolation
valves will be opened automatically immediately
after MECO. The purpose of the relief lines is to
prevent excessive pressure build-ups, generated by
heatup and expansion of the propellants in the
feedline manifolds, by allowing the pressure to be
vented overboard through the relief valves.
12
Be
. LH 2 RTLS Feedline Dump Line - This is a single
2-inch diameter line which connects to the LH 2
feedline manifold at one end and to an overboard
port at the other end. (The overboard port is
located on the outer skin of the left side of the
Orbiter between the Orbital Maneuvering System
(OMS) pod and the upper surface of the wing.)
The line is used for dumping residual LH 2 during
an RTLS abort. In non-RTLS situations, the pilot
can use the backup LH 2 dump switch to open these
valves. Flow through the line is controlled by
2 series-connected, normally closed, LH 2 RTLS
dump valves (i inboard, 1 outboard) which are
mounted in the line. The LH 2 RTLS dump valves
are controlled automatically by GPC commands.
Gaseous propellant Collection and Supply Network. The
network consists of all the lines used to collect and
supply gaseous propellants (GO2 and GH2) from all three
SSMEs to the ET to maintain propellant tank pressure
during main engine burn. (Note: This network has no
major function after ET separation.) Specifically, the
gaseous propellant collection and supply network
consists of the following.
i. Engine ET Pressurization Output Lines - There are
6 0.63-inch diameter pressurization lines in the
Orbiter, 3 for GO 2 and 3 for GH 2. Each of the GO2
pressurization lines connects to the oxidizer heat
exchanger outlet of 1 of the SSMEs at 1 end and the
GO2 ET pressurization manifold at the other end.
Each of the GH2 pressurization lines connects to
the LPFT turbine outlet of 1 of the SSMEs at 1 end
and the GH2 ET pressurization manifold at the other
end. Six flow control valves are used to control
ullage pressure in the two ET propellant tanks.
, ET Pressurization Manifolds - There are 2 2-inch
diameter manifolds in the Orbiter, 1 for GO 2 and 1
for GH 2. At each end of both manifolds are self-
sealing quick disconnects. The pressurization
manifolds connect to the ET gaseous propellant
umbilicals at 1 set of quick-disconnects and to
the GSE helium pressurization umbilicals at the
other set of quick-disconnects. The GSE helium
pressurization umbilicals (2) are used for the
initial pressurization of the ET propellant tanks
during prelaunch.
Each pressurization manifold contains inlets for
he 3 engine ET pressurization output lines. (The
ET GH 2 pressurization manifold contains,in
addition to the three inlets, an outlet for the




• GH2 Pressurization Vent Line - This is a single
line which connects to the ET GH2 pressurization
manifold line at I end and to an overboard port at
the other end. This line is used exclusively for
vacuum inerting the GH 2 pressurization lines during
orbit. Flow through the line is controlled by the
normally closed GH 2 pressurization line vent valve
which is mounted in the line. This valve is
controlled by the GH2 PRESS LINE VENT switch on
cockpit Panel R4.
Valves - There are 2 basic types of valves used in the
PMS: those that are pneumatically actuated and those
that are electrically actuated• Pneumatically
actuated valves are used where large loads are
encountered, such as in the control of liquid
propellant flows• Electrically actuated valves are
used where lighter loads are encountered, such as in
the control of gaseous propellant flows.
Pneumatically actuated valves can be further divided
into 2 subtypes - those that require pneumatic pressure
to open and close the valve (type i) and those that are
spring-loaded to 1 position and require pneumatic
pressure to move to the other position (type 2).
The following is a list of the type 1 valves.
LH 2 feedline disconnect valve
LO 2 feedline disconnect valve
LH 2 prevalves (3)
LO 2 prevalves (3)
LH 2 inboard fill/drain valve
LO 2 inboard fill/drain valve
LH 2 outboard fill/drain valve
LO 2 outboard fill/drain valve
Each type 1 valve actuator is equipped with 2
electrically actuated solenoid valves. Each of the
2 solenoid valves controls helium pressure to either
an "open" port or a "close" port on the actuator.
Energizing the solenoid valve connected to the "open"
port will allow helium pressure to open the pneumatic
valve. Similarly, closing of the pneumatic valve is
performed by energizing the solenoid valve connected
to the "close" port. (The LO 2 Prevalves have 4
solenoids, two redundant solenoids each to control
helium pressure to the "open" and to the" closed"
ports.)
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Removing power from a solenoid valve not only removes
helium pressure from the corresponding port of the
pneumatic actuator, but also allows the helium pressure
trapped in that side of the actuator to vent overboard.
Removing power from both solenoids allows the pneumatic
valve to remain in its last commanded position.
The following is a list of the type 2 valves.
LH 2 RTLS inboard dump valve, Normally Closed (NC)
LH 2 RTLS outboard dump valve (NC)
LH 2 feedline relief shutoff valve, Normally Open (NO)
LO 2 feedline relief shutoff valve (NO)
LO 2 Pogo accumulator recirculation valve (NO)
Each type 2 valve is equipped with a single electrically
actuated solenoid valve which controls helium pressure
to either an "open" port or a "close" port on the
actuator. Removing power from the solenoid valve
removes helium pressure from the corresponding port of
the pneumatic actuator and allows helium pressure
trapped in that side of the actuator to vent overboard.
Spring force will then take over and drive the valve to
the opposite position. If the spring force drives the
valve to the open position, the valve is referred to as
a Normally Open (NO) valve. If the spring force drives
the valve to the closed position, the valve is referred
to as a Normally Closed (NC) valve.
The following is a list of the electrically actuated
solenoid valves:
H_ pressurization line vent valve (NC)
Gn 2 pressurization flow control valves (3) (NO)
GO 2 pressurization flow control valves (3) (NO)
The above electrically actuated valves are spring-loaded
to one position and move to the other position when power
is applied. These valves are referred to as either
normally open or normally closed, based on their position
in the de-energized state.
3.1.3 Orbiter MPS - Helium Subsystem General Description
The helium subsystem consists of 7 4.7-ft3 helium supply tanks, 3
17.3-ft3 helium supply tanks, and their associated regulators,
check valves, distribution lines, and control valves (Figure 5).
Four of the 4.7-ft3 helium supply tanks are located within the
Orbiter aft of the payload bay area. The other 3 4.7-ft3 supply
tanks and the three 17.3-ft3 supply tanks are located below the
payload bay liner and above the main landing gear cavity. Each of
the 17.3-ft3 supply tanks is plumbed to two of the 4.7-ft3 supply
tanks (I in the mid-body, the other in the aft body) to form 3
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sets of 3 tanks. Each set of tanks, thus formed, normally provides
helium to only one engine and for this reason is commonly referred
to by the engine's designation; for example, "left engine helium."
This helium is used for in-flight purges of engines, aft
compartments, and provides pressure for actuating engine valves
during emergency pneumatic shutdowns.
The remaining 4.7-ft3 helium supply tank (the 1 which is not
connected to a 17.3-ft3 tank) is called the "pneumatic helium"
supply tank. It normally provides pressure to actuate all of the
pneumatically operated valves within the propellant management
subsystem (Figure 5).
Each of the 4 helium supply circuits described above (3 engine
helium and one pneumatic helium) will operate independently until
after MECO, when the 3 "out" helium interconnect valves will be
opened, connecting all circuits to a common manifold. This
interconnection can be performed manually by the crew; however,
normally the GPC will automatically interconnect the circuits just
before the start of the MPS propellant dump.
3.1.4 Helium Subsystem Components
The helium subsystem contains the following major components.
ao Supply Tank - Each engine helium supply tank cluster
consists of 2 4.7-ft3 supply tanks and I 17.3-ft3 supply
tank. One of the 4.7-ft3 tanks and the 17.3-ft3 tank
are located in the mid-body area of the Shuttle under
the payload bay liner, in an area originally reserved
for additional Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
(PRSD) cryogenic storage. The 17.3-ft3 tank is identical
to that used in the OMS. The remaining 4.7-ft3 tank is
located in the rear of the Shuttle, aft of the payload
bay bulkhead. The single 4.7-ft3 pneumatic helium supply
tank is also located in this area. Prior to lift-off,
all helium supply tanks will be pressurized to anominal
value of 4500 psia.
S. Solenoid Actuated Valves - All of the valves in the
helium subsystem are spring-loaded to one position and
electrically actuated to the other position.
Valve position is controlled via electrical signals from
either the GPCs or a manual switch. The crew can control
only a portion of the valves through cockpit switches,





































•._..= _._---,_.- , ',_-- _ _
-"r-
.._ _ c..,_ ._















Supply Tank Isolation Valves - There are 8 supply tank
isolation valves in the helium subsystem. The valves
are connected in parallel to each engine helium supply
tank cluster and to the pneumatic supply tank in pairs.
In the case of the engine helium supply tanks, each pair
of isolation valves control helium flow through 1 leg of
a dual helium supply regulator circuit. Each helium
supply circuit contains 2 check valves, a filter, an
isolation valve, a regulator, and a relief valve.
The 2 isolation valves connected to the pneumatic supply
tank are also connected in parallel. The rest of the
corresponding helium supply circuit consists of a filter,
the 2 isolation valves, a regulator, a relief valve, and
a single check valve.
Each isolation valve (with the exception of the 2
pneumatic helium isolation valves) can be individually
controlled by its own cockpit switch. The 2 pneumatic
helium isolation valves are controlled by a single
switch on Panel R2.
Interconnect Valves - Each engine helium supply tank
cluster has 2 interconnect valves. Each valve in the
pair of interconnect valves is connected in series with
a check valve. Because of the check valves, helium can
flow through the interconnect valves in 1 direction
only. The interconnect valves are oriented in such a
manner that 1 interconnect valve controls helium flow
into the circuit and the other interconnect valve
controls helium flow out of the circuit. The "in"
interconnect valve controls the flow into the associated
engine helium distribution lines from the pneumatic
helium supply tank. The "out" interconnect valve
controls helium flow out of the associated engine helium
supply tank cluster to the pneumatic helium distribution
lines.
Each pair of interconnect valves (per engine) is
controlled by a single cockpit switch. This switch has
3 positions: IN OPEN/OUT CLOSE, GPC, and IN CLOSE/OUT
OPEN. With the switch in the IN OPEN/OUT CLOSE position,
the "in" interconnect valve will be opened and the "out"
interconnect valve closed. The IN CLOSE/ OUT OPEN
switch position will do the reverse. With the switch
in the GPC position, both valves are closed unless
commanded to the open position by the GPCs. In the
event of an RTLS during a normal flight the GPC will
signal the "in" interconnect valve to open automatically
at MECO and close automatically 20 seconds later. The
"out" interconnect valve is opened automatically at the




the end of the LH 2 dump. If an engine was shut down
prior to MECO, however, the corresponding "in" inter-
connect valve will remain closed at MECO. At any other
time, placing the switch in the GPC position results in
both interconnect valves closing and remaining closed.
There is an additional crossover (interconnect) valve
connected downstream of the left engine helium supply
regulators to the pneumatic helium distribution system.
In the event of a pneumatic helium regulator failure
(Note: only 1 regulator in this line), this crossover
valve would be opened, the pneumatic helium isolation
valve would be closed, and the left engine helium supply
would then provide regulated helium pressure through the
crossover valve to the pneumatic helium distribution
system. This crossover valve is controlled by its own
3-position cockpit switch. The 3 switch positions are
labeled OPEN, GPC, and CLOSE.
Manifold pressurization valves - (Figure 6A) - The
manifold pressurization valves are located downstream
of the pneumatic helium pressure regulator and are
used to control the flow of helium to the propellant
manifolds during nominal propellant dumps and manifold
repressurization. There are 4 of these valves, grouped
in pairs. One pair of valves controls helium pressure
to the LO 2 propellant manifolds, and the other pair
controls _elium pressure to the LH 2 propellant
manifolds.
_ RTLS Dump Pressurization Valves (Figure 6B) - The
2 RTLS dump pressurization valves are located
downstream of the pneumatic helium pressure regulator
and are used to control the pressurization of the LH 2
propellant manifolds during an RTLS LH2.dum p. There
are 2 of these valves, connected in serles. Unlike the
LH 2 manifold pressurization valves, the LH 2 RTLS dump
pressurization valves cannot be controlled-from the
cockpit. During an RTLS abort, valves will be opened
and closed automatically by GPC commands.
One additional difference between the nominal and the
RTLS LH 2 dumps is in the routing of the helium and the
location at which it enters the LH 2 feedline manifold.
For the nominal LH 2 dump, helium passes through the LH 2
manifold pressurization valves and enters the feedline
manifold in the vicinity of the LH 2 feedline disconnect
valve. For the RTLS LH 2 dump, hellum passes through
the LH 2 RTLS dump pressurization valves and enters the
feedline manifold in the vicinity of the LH 2 inboard
fill/drain valve (on the inboard side).
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Go pressure Regulators - Each engine helium supply tank
cluster has 2 pressure regulators, operating in parallel.
Each regulator controls pressure in 1 leg of a dual-
redundant helium supply circuit. The pressure regulators
for the helium supply tanks are set to provide outlet
pressures in the range of 715 psig to 770 psig. Down-
tream of this regulator are 2 more regulators, the LH 2
manifold pressure regulator and the LO 2 manifold pressure
regulator. These regulators are used only during MPS
propellant dump and manifold repressurization. Both
regulators are set to provide outlet pressures in the
range of 20 to 25 psig. Flow through the regulators is
controlled by the appropriate set (2) of normally closed
manifold pressurization valves (Figure 6).
H. Reli_ Valves - Downstream of each pressure regulator
(with the exception of the 2 manifold repress regulators)
is a relief valve. The purpose of the relief valve is
to protect the downstream helium distribution lines
from the overpressurization (and rupture) in the event
the associated pressure regulator fails fully open. The
relief valves in the helium supply circuits are set to
relieve at 825 +/- 25 psig and reseat at 785 psig.
3.2 Intez£aces and Locations
The MPS system hardware is located in the aft fuselage compartment
behind the payload bay but forward of the main engines. The MPS
system interfaces with the Orbiter's 3 main engines, the external
tank, and the ground during prelaunch and post landing.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the MPS hardware components.
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the MPS hardware initially generated 690
failure mode worksheets and identified 371 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order
to facilitate comparison, 573 additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 1264 FMEAs and 749 CIL
items. Upon completion of the assessment, 865 of the 1264 FMEAs
were in agreement. Schedule and budget constraints prevented
resolution of those that were not in agreement.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment









TOTAL 1264 1365 399
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II. The issues count shown accounts for those cases
where a RI/NASA analysis was matched to more than one IOA
analysis and thus may have been declared an issue on more than
one assessment sheet. When the multiple IOA recommended
criticalities generated in this way agree, only one issue is
















Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights
the NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID.
Appendix E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.I.0-
WP-VA86001-22, Analysis of the Main Propulsion System, 16 January
1987. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA
and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE III: Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities

























Of the failure modes analyzed, 714 were determined to be
critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items























TOTAL 239 230 2 218 0 22 711
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers















1 - 200, 401 - 838
201 - 400, 901 - 924
4.1 Assessment Results - Mechanical Components
The IOA Assessment of the RI/NASA MPS mechanical component FMEA/
CIL review resulted in 412 issues, or differences, in analysis
results.
Differences between IOA and RI/NASA are attributable to several
factors. The Instructions for Preparation of FMEA/CIL (NSTS 22206)
document is in many places subject to varying interpretation. IOA
and RI/NASA differed on several points.
The RI/NASA team tended to have a broader view of an item's
function than did IOA. This led, in many cases, to different
criticalities.
Another difficulty was the matter of redundancy. (This is related
to the issue of function, noted above.) Again, the RI/NASA team
adopted a broader view of redundancy than did IOA. The RI/NASA
team, for example, viewed sequential main engine failures as loss
of redundancy. IOA believes engines are not redundant to each
other because, while they perform identical functions, they do not
perform the same function. That is, when one engine is shut down,
the remaining engines cannot provide the thrust that has been lost.
(An exception would be periods of reduced throttle level, but these
are excluded by the FMEA/CIL "worst case" requirement.)
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The NSTS 22206 document, however, requires (2.3.3L) that a
functional criticality of IR be assigned to any failure(s) that
result in an engine shutdown. A single engine shutdown will
result in an intact abort, thus the logical functional
criticality assignment would be 2R, for loss of mission. The
RI/NASA analysis arrived at a IR functional criticality not
because of the requirement, but because of an interpretation of
redundancy that differs from that of the IOA.
Yet another area of differing opinions was the RI/NASA practice
of introducing criticality i/i failures, such as line breaks or
leaks, as a second failure, thereby creating a 2/IR criticality
regardless of the first failure. IOA concludes that, in most
cases, this is not consistent with the NSTS 22206 methodology or
definitions.
The foregoing differences of opinion and interpretation are the
primary causes of the different results of the IOA and RI/NASA
FMEA/CIL. Figure i presents a comparison of the proposed Post 51-L
NASA baseline, with the IOA recommended baseline, and any issues.
4.2 &ssessment Results - Electrioal/Eloctronio Components
Analyses of electrical/electronic components are a reflection of
their corresponding mechanical components. As such, the same
differences of opinion and interpretation resulted in similar
differences in criticality assignment as for the mechanical
components. These are explained in Section 4.1 above.
27
5 •0 REFERENCES
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
1. Main Propulsion System Workbook, 3/01/82
2. Main Propulsion System - Fluid Flows, 10/25/78
3. Shuttle Flight Operations Manual, Volume 8A, MPS, 8/31/81
4. Booster Systems Briefs, 10/01/84
5. SSME Training Data, Engine Orientation, 5/31/80
6. Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL for the STS,
NSTS 22206, 10/10/86
7. Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Volumes 1-2, Revision C,
DNC-5, 9/13/85
8. Integrated System Schematic, MPS, OV-099, 103, 104, 5/27/86
9. STS Mission Problem Tracking List
i0. OV-099 Operational Configuration CIL, Mechanical/Fluid
Systems, Book 1 of 4, 3/01/82
ii. OV-099 Operational Configuration CIL, ECLSS/Power Systems,
Book 2 of 4, 3/01/82
12. OV Operational Configuration CIL, Propulsion Systems, Book 3
of 4, 11/01/82
13. OV Operational Configuration CIL, Avionics Systems, Book 4
of 4, 11/01/82
14. Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications,
12/17/85
15. Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification
Document, 3/06/86
16. Problem Records, 7/22/86
17. Shuttle Orbiter 0V-I02 CDR, Safety Analysis Report, Volume
i, Management Summary, 4/27/77
18. Shuttle Orbiter OV-I02 CDR, Safety Analysis Report, Volume
II, Structures Systems, 4/27/77
19. Shuttle Orbiter OV-102 CDR, Safety Analysis Report, Volume
III, Mechanical Systems, 4/27/77
20. Shuttle Orbiter OV-i02 CDR, Safety Analysis Report, Volume
IV, Propulsion Systems, 4/27/77
21. Shuttle Orbiter OV-I02 CDR, Safety Analysis Report, Volume
V, Power System, 4/27/77
22. Shuttle Orbiter 0V-i02 CDR, Safety Analysis Report, Volume
VII, ECLSS, 4/27/77
23. Shuttle Orbiter OV-I02 CDR, Safety Analysis Report, Volume
VIII, Crew Station Systems, 4/27/77
24. FMEA - Lightweight and Heavyweight Tanks, 7/20/81
25. Integrated System Schematic, OV-102, MPS, 10/26/79
26. Crew Software Interface, CSI 2102, 9/30/84
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a. MC271-0073, LH 2 Engine Feed Line Assembly, 10/26/83
b. MC271-0074, LO 2 Engine Feed Line Assembly, 11/07/83
c. MC271-0075, LH 2 Line Assembly, 5/28/80
d. MC271-0076, LH2/LO 2 Fill & Drain Line Assembly,
12/02/83
e. MC276-0003, 1 Inch GHE & GN2 Disconnect, 1/11/85
f. MC276-0004, 1.5 Inch LO_/LH 2 Disconnect, 1/04/85
g. MC276-0005, LO2/LH 2 Orbiter to Ground Fill & Drain
Disconnect, 4/18/83
h. MC276-0032, Test Point Couplings, 2/10/75
i. MC280-0017, H2 & 02 Pressurant Flow Control Valve
4/11/84
j. MC281-0030, LH 2 Recirculation Pump Assembly, 4/12/82
k. MC284-0389, LH2/LO 2 Orbiter to Tank Feed System
Disconnect, 2/01/82
i. MC284-0390, LH 2 Orbiter to Tank Recirculation Disconnect,
7/27/79
MC284-0391, GH2/GO2 Orbiter to Tank Disconnect, 10/25/79
MC284-0395, LO2/LH 2 1.5/2 Inch Shutoff Valve, 6/27/79
MC284-0396, Propellant Shutoff Prevalve, 7/24/82
MC284-0397, Propellant Fill & Drain Valve, 6/22/84
MC284-0403, Two Way Solenoid Valve, 6/24/80
MC284-0406, LO2/LH 2 Relief Shutoff Valve, 5/05/76
ME284-0479, Engine Isolation Check Valve, 8/20/80
MC284-0501, Engine Isolation Check Valve, 1/31/83
MC284-0515, Dual Check Valve, 11/11/82
MC432-0205, LO2/LH 2 Level Point Sensor, 4/15/81
ME284-0472, HE Check Valve, 4/04/80
MC284-0404, 3 Way HE Solenoid Valve, 4/01/75
MC284-0533, HE Regulator, 11/13/79
MC284-0399, LO 2 Manif Repress Regulator
MC284-0398, HE Relief Valve, 12/14/77
MC282-0082, HE Supply Tank, 12/14/76
MC282-0070, LO 2 Prevalve Pneu Accumulator, 10/31/75
ME276-0032, Test Point Coupling, 2/10/75
ME284-0474, LH 2 3/8 Inch Relief Valve, 9/10/74
ME286-0056, HE Supply Filter, 11/04/74
VO70-451756, Pneu HE Panel 4 Test Port
VO70-415532, LH 2 Repress Reg Outlet Test Port, 12/08/75
VO70-415568, LO 2 Repress Reg Outlet Test Port, 5/17/76
VO70-415585, Helium Fill Disc. Check Valve Test Port,
4/16/76









VO70-415790, HE Supply Test Port, 4/13/78
VO70-415133, Check Valve CV24 Leakage Test Port,
8121180
VO70-415545, LH 2 Feed Manif RTLS Repress Orifice,
12/19/75
VO70-414548, LH 2 Pressurization System Test Port
Fittings, 3/25/76
VO70-415468, LO 2 Relief System Test Port Fitting,
7/13/77
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES r AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions Fo[ preparation
o$ FMEA/CIL. i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIOMS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCy CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSIQN TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans, middeck
P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter power-
up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode 301
and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear touchdown and
ends with the completion of post-landing safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions for Preparation
of FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, was employed with the following
amplifications and additions•
i• The operational flight software is an accurate implementation
of the Flight System Software Requirements (FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
• After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew is
beyond the scope of this task.
• Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
4. All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is designed
to detect and identify problems before the item
is approved for use.
• All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error are
out-of-scope of this task.
• All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with other
analyses requires that both analyses be performed






Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually monitored
during AOS by ground-based personnel is not required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in any
previous phase, whichever produces the worst case effects for
the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a thorough
and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed nor
FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior to NSTS
22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was Substantially complete prior to NSTS
22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to ensure
consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
B.3 SUBSYSTEM SPECIFIC GROUNDRULE8 AND ASSUMPTION8
The IOA was performed to the component/assembly level of the sub-
system of the MPS. The analysis considered the worst case effects
of the hardware/functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew/vehicle safety.
Ii All like and unlike redundancy will be considered in
determining functional criticality. The MPS function is to
provide delta V for the vehicle to reach orbit. Since loss
of 1 main engine during the early part of ascent requires a
mission abort, any failure that results in the loss of 1
main engine will be considered loss of mission (Crit 2).
Since, for most of the ascent, 2 engines are required for a
successful abort, loss of 2 or 3 engines will be considered
loss of life/vehicle (Crit 1).
RATIONALE: These failure modes are directly applicable to
worst case MPS subsystem component analyses.
. Only MPS Orbiter items will be analyzed for the MPS interface
to the Ground, External Tank, and the Main Engines.
RATIONALE: Non-orbiter program hardware are not within the
scope of this task.
• Aborts are assumed to be caused by loss of an engine• Any
failure within a component that can shut down an engine could
leave only 1 engine in operation and therefore could lead to
loss of vehicle (Crit 1).
RATIONALE: This failure mode is directly applicable to worst




This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets resulted from the comparison of the RI/NASA
FMEA/CIL (Post 51-L) to the IOA analysis worksheets in MDAC
Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-22 with additional worksheets
in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the NASA
FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet ID
(Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission













= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
Included in CIL
Compare Row :















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-001X BASELINE [ ]
2025-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
1




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [










NASA FMEA #: 2000-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLERS, 3A (4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 3
ITEM: DIODES, 12A (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 4
ITEM: DIODE, 12A (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2002-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5
ITEM: DIODES, 12A (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2002-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6
ITEM: DIODE, 12A (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS, TYPE I (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
8
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2381-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 9
ITEM: DIODES, 12A (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2381-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS READILY DETECTABLE.
[ ]
[ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2263-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HIGH POINT OPEN HDC (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]


























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-014X BASELINE [ ]
2267-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
14
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-015X BASELINE [ ]
2267-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
15
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [





NASA FMEA #: 2272-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HIGH POINT OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY REF AVAIL: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
EPD&C/MPS
17
HIGH POINT OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (2)
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] C ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE COULD ALLOW GH2 TO ENTER SSME's AT IGNITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2275-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FILL AND DRAIN LAI MDM BLOCKING DIODE (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE REDUNDANCY AGAINST A PREMATURE CLOSE OF
THE F/D VALVE. SECOND FAILURE CANNOT CLOSE THE VALVE BECAUSE OF
BLOCKING DIODES AND MDM OPEN COMMANDS.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
19




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C



















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
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HIGH POINT LAI MDM BLOCKING DIODE (2)
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE COULD LEAD TO GH2 INGESTION AT SSME START.





NASA FMEA #: 2278-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HIGH POINT LAI MDM BLOCKING DIODE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 202600-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HIGH POINT MONITOR RESISTORS, 5.1K (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE INHIBITS MONITORING
[ ]
[ ]

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2354A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LAI MDM ISOLATION DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




DIODE NOT SHOWN ON VS72-941102, SHT 14.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2354A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LAI MDM ISOLATION DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DIODE NOT SHOWN ON VS72-941102, SHT 14.
[ ]
C ]











OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DIODE NOT SHOWN ON VS72-941102, SHT 14.
C ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]




NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SHORTING OF THE OPEN CONTACT TO GROUND IN THIS SWITCH IS
INFEASIBLE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2357A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CLOSE SWITCH ISOLATION DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
Ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















CLOSE MDM ISOLATION DIODE





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
MPS-032X
2359A-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
32




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-033X
2359A-I
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
33












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SHORT IN DIODE COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
MPS-034X
2360A-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
34




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
35
SWITCH SCAN BLEED RESISTORS, I.SK (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MDM LAI NOT SHOWN ON VS72-941102, SHT 14.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOW VALVE TO OPEN.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2062-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 39
ITEM: CLOSE HDC (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC C OUTPUT DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

















RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2240A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2397-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC A OUTPUT DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE DIODE MIGHT BE CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND
TURNAROUND WITH NO DESIGN MODIFICATION.











RPC A OUTPUT DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SERIES CONFIGURATION AND BISTABLE FEATURE PREVENT VALVE CLOSURE
ON A SECOND FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2246-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA, [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















CLOSE HDC, TYPE III (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















DIODE, CLOSE RPC B OUTPUT





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















DIODE, CLOSE RPC B OUTPUT





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE MAY NOT BE DETECTED.
C ]
[ ]
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE CAN SHORT ALL CLOSING COMMANDS TO GROUND, PREVENTING
VALVE CLOSURE. ET SEP WITH VALVE OPEN CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.











DIODE, OPEN RPC B OUTPUT





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)


















DIODE, OPEN RPC B OUTPUT





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]







COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FAILURE CAN SHORT ALL OPEN COMMANDS TO GROUND, VENTING OPENING
PRESSURE AND ALLOWING VALVE TO CLOSE DURING MAIN ENGINE BURN.
BISTABLE FEATURE IS THE ONLY REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE
CLOSURE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-058X BASELINE [ ]
2254-1 NEW [ ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
58




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
59



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]











DIODE, CLOSE RPC C OUTPUT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















DIODE, CLOSE RPC C OUTPUT











NASA C 3 /IR ] C P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE CAN SHORT ALL CLOSE COMMANDS TO GROUND, PREVENTING
VALVE CLOSURE. MECAHNICAL LINKAGE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.











DIODE, OPEN RPC C OUTPUT





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















DIODE, OPEN RPC C OUTPUT





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87.
[ ]
[ ]













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WILL PREVENT VALVE CLOSURE DURING ET SEPARATION.
FAILURE OF MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE ET/ORBITER
RECONTACT.
A













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ i /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY RED_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ANALYSIS IS FOR ABORT ONLY. THE FAILURE PREVENTS PROPELLANT
ISOLATION FROM FAILED MAIN ENGINE.
















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FMEA NO. 05-6J-2101-3 REV 10/10/87 IS FOR THE ABORT CASE ONLY.
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE ABORT CASE ONLY. INADVERTENT POWER TO
THE CLOSE SOLENOID DOES NOT CAUSE A LOSS OF CLOSE SOLENOID POWER.
















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 2026-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HDC - GND C/O COMMAND POWER (5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C












NASA FMEA #: 2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HDC - GND C/O COMMAND POWER (5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /3 ]







COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-072X
2031-1
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
72




[ HA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2032-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HDC, RELAY CONTROL POWER (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HDC, RELAY CONTROL POWER (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA DOES NOT CALL THE FAILURE OF A TRANSDUCER AND THE SWITCH TO
STANDBY TRANSDUCER A FAILURE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /IR ] [ P ] C F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SECOND FAILURE WILL NOT OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET.
[ ]
[ ]











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SECOND FAILURE WILL NOT OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET, BUT A THIRD
FAILURE COULD CAUSE ET OVERPRESSURIZATION.





NASA FMEA #: 2035-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (6)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
85




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















SWITCH SCAN BLEED RESISTOR





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )









NASA FMEA #: 2235-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH SCAN DIODES (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-089X
2236-1
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
89




[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [p]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2236-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MDM INHIBIT COMMAND DIODES (6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] ,[ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2340-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 91
ITEM: LOCK RPC (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO. 05-6J-2340-i REV. 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2340-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 92
ITEM: LOCK RPC (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO. 05-6J-2340-2 REV. 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2341-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 93
ITEM: UNLOCK RPC (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO. 05-6J-2341-i REV. 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2341-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 94
ITEM: UNLOCK RPC (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO. 05-6J-2341-2 REV. 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA NO. 05-6J-2342-I REV. 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2342-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 96
ITEM: LOCK HDC I





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA NO. 05-6J-2342-2 REV. 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.







MPS-097X BASELINE [ ]
2343-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 97




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO. 05-6J-2343-I REV. 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2343-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 98
ITEM: UNLOCK HDC I




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3/IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO. 05-6J-2343-2 REV. 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











LOCK HDC III (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


















LOCK HDC III (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [

















UNLOCK HDC III (2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
103




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
104



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2346-3 REV 11/4/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2347-3 REV 11/19/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











LOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

















LOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















LOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2348-3 REV 11/04/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











UNLOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















UNLOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2350-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-II6X BASELINE [ ]
2351-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
116
UNLOCK POSITION SWITCH MONITOR RESISTORS (2)
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. THE
FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2352-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOCK POSITION SWITCH MONITOR RESISTORS (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-II8X BASELINE [ ]
2353-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
118




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2376-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



















NASA [ 3 /IR ]





LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
B. SLAUGHTER
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2376-3 REV 11/04/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [











UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2378--1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If' different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2198-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCHES (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3/IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-129X
2198-5
COMP_ [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
129
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVES OPEN COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
131
LH2 PREVALVES OPEN COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-132X BASELINE [ ]
2206-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
132
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
133





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2207-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE RPC CROSSOVER DIODES, 12A




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2208-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE RPC CROSSOVER DIODE, 12A (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 PREVALVES OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-139X BASELINE [ ]
2210-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
139




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-140X BASELINE [ ]
2211-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
140




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]












(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
141
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2213-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 PREVALVES MAINSTAGE BLOCKING DIODES (6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-143X
2214-2


























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2215-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE SWITCH COMMAND A BLOCKING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2216-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SWITCH COMMAND C BLOCKING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]











NASA FMEA #: 2217-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SWITCH COMMAND B BLOCKING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2218-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE SWITCH B&C BLOCKING DIODES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
C ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
148




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-149X BASELINE [ ]
2220-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
149
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-150X BASELINE [ ]
2221-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
150




[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2392-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVES OPEN COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















LH2 PREVALVES OPEN COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2393-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 2393-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 0518-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CV16)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF GO2 FROM THIS CHECK VALVE WOULD CAUSE
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE AFT COMPARTMENT AND BUCKLING OF THE L02
TANK DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC FORCES ACTING ON AN UNPRESSURIZED TANK.
NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE RI/NASA CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OF
12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0451-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA ANALYSIS APPLIES TO REENTRY PURGE. FAILURE MAY ALLOW
CONTAMINATION TO ENTER THE SYSTEM.
NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES
(REF. J.E. BORCHES).





NASA FMEA #: 0451-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31,33,35)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE RI/NASA CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OF
12-23-87 AND THE RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET DATED 9-16-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0519-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53,54,55)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0408-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0408-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0408-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE TO CLOSE IS ADDRESSED ON 0408-6. FAILURE OF THE
INDICATOR WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REF:
87.
RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-





NASA FMEA #: 0408-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED DISCONNECT (PD1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0803-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEED DISCONNECT (PD1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED UNDER 0408-5, LOSS OF
POSITION INDICATION, OR 0408-10, ERRONEOUS INDICATION.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0454-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0454-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0454-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L02 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.















LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0454-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L02 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ I /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE TO UNLOCK IS ADDRESSED ON 0454-3. FAILURE OF THE
INDICATOR HAS NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF
12-15-87.














NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
215
LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0454-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L02 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0805-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE COVERED UNDER 0454-5, LOSS OF POSITION
INDICATION, OR 0454-6, ERRONEOUS INDICATION. REF: RI/NASA CIL
OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0303-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FILL AND DRAIN DISCONNECT (PD12)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0303-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FILL AND DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDI2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).





NASA FMEA #: 0303-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FILL AND DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDI2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).





NASA FMEA #: 0303-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FILL AND DRAIN DISCONNECT (PD12)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).





NASA FMEA #: 0401-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES (J.E. BORCHES).











L02 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADEQUATLEY ADDRESSED UNDER ERRONEOUS
INDICATION (0401-6).
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0414-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS ADDRESSED ON 0414-3.
FAILURE OF THE INDICATION SYSTEM ONLY WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-23-
87.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
226




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 0414-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0311-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS ADDRESSED ON 0311-4.
FAILURE OF THE POSITION INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-10-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0311-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-10-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0311-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
C ]




ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-23 IX
NASA FMEA #: 0311-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (I f different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-10-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS ADDRESSED ON 0310-4.
FAILURE OF THE POSITION INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-9-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0310-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)









NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COSPARE [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-9-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0310-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV10)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-9-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0310-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0310-11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-9-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0806-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVIO)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER ERRONEOUS
INDICATION (0310-3) AND LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION (0310-9).
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
238




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C














NASA FMEA #: 0452-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PV19)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-13-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0453-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRC VALVE (PV20, 21)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN IS ADDRESSED ON 0453-1. FAILURE OF THE
INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 10-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0453-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRC VALVE (PV20, 21)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0427-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2/LO2 PROPELLANT LEVEL SENSORS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE C N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT ALSO COVERS LH2 SENSORS.
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT UNDERFILL.









NASA FMEA #: 0427-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2/LO2 PROPELLANT LEVEL SENSORS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT ALSO COVERS LH2 SENSORS.
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT OVERFILL.











NASA FMEA #: 0410-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 DELTA-P TRANSDUCER (MT44)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.











NEW [ X ]
MPS
248
LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH 3, 4, 5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0460-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH 3, 4, 5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FOAM INSULATED LINE. REF:









NASA FMEA #: 0609-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURE MANIFOLD REPRESS ORIFICE (RPI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0422-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 BLEED LINE, 1.5" DIA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0424-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 RELIEF LINE (PV7 TO RV5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-24-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0455-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 RELIEF LINE, i" DIA (RV5 TO EXIT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-23-
87.











LO2 RELIEF SENSE LINE,
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
.38" DIA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-24-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0456-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 RELIEF SENSE LINE, .38" DIA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE MAY PREVENT RELIEF VALVE FROM OPENING. REDUNDANCY EXISTS
TO RELIEVE MANIFOLD PRESSURE.





NASA FMEA #: 0428-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 BLEED RECIRC & POGO SUPPRESSION LINE, i,












[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X _] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 10-6-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0428-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 BLEED RECIRC & POGO SUPPRESSION LINE, i,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE MODE IS ADDRESSED ON 0428-1. THIS FMEA/CIL SHOULD BE
DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 0433-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 DELTA PRESSURE LINE, .25" DIA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0434-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 259
ITEM: LO2 FEEDLINE SCREEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-11-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0434-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 260
ITEM: LO2 FEEDLINE SCREEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-11-
87.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-261X BASELINE [ ]
0458-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
261




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [








RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL MEETING NOTES.














NEW [ X ]
MPS
262
GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE, .63" DIA, CV TO
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL MEETING NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0509-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (LV53, 54, 55 TO




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL MEETING NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0510-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (CVI6 TO PD9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE WILL ALLOW LEAKAGE OF GO2 INTO AFT COMPARTMENT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0515-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
266
LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE 2/IR CRITICALITY APPLIES
TO THE LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER ONLY. FOR LO2
THERE WOULD BE NO EFFECT. REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND
RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0515-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0522-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.















NEW [ X ]
MPS
269
L02 SENSE LINE (PDI TO PR5)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-270X BASELINE [ ]
0626-5 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
270




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0626-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 MANIFOLD PRESSURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)




RELIEF SYSTEM WILL PROTECT AGAINST MANIFOLD RUPTURE. NO
REDUNDANCY FOR TRANSDUCER FAILURE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0626-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 DISCONNECT PRESSURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0627-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 ENGINE INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P J [ F J [ P _ [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0627-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 ENGINE OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES POSTULATE LEAKAGE OF THE
ANTI-FLOOD VALVE IN COMBINATION WITH TRANSDUCER FAILURE. THIS
VIOLATES NSTS 22206 2.3.2d, THE REQUIREMENT THAT INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN THEIR
SPECIFIED TOLERANCES. MULTIPLE FAILURES CAN ALLOW ENGINE START
WHEN CONDITIONS ARE NOT ACTUALLY WITHIN LIMITS. REF: RI/NASA
CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0627-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 FEED MANIFOLD DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES 3/IR FOR A PAD ABORT (PRELAUNCH).
THIS ASSUMED FAILURE OF THE ENGINE BLEED VALVE, WHICH VIOLATES
NSTS 22206 2.3.2d, THE REQUIREMENT THAT INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS
WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATING WITHIN THEIR SPECIFIED
TOLERANCES. REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL
REVIEW MEETING NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0701-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2/LH2 NAFLEX FLANGE FACE SEALS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [






REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0702-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2/LH2 METALLIC BOSS SEALS (K SEALS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0703-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 278
ITEM: GO2/GH2 K SEALS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL FMEA/CIL REVIEW
MEETING NOTES.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
MPS-279X
0707-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
279




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 0301-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0301-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV12)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ Y ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-23-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0301-11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RI/NASA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIES A 1/1 CRITICALITY FOR RTLS AND TAL
ABORTS. IOA CONCURS.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-23-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0808-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER ERRONEOUS
INDICATION (0301-3) AND LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION (0301-8).





NASA FMEA #: 0302-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVII)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0302-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-24-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0302-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-24-
87.

















NEW [ X ]
MPS
287
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [x]*
] [ ]





THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER ERRONEOUS
INDICATION (0302-3) AND LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION (0302-7).
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0303-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






1/42 FILL & DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDII)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ I /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0303-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FILL & DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDII)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0303-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FILL & DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDII)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0303-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FILL & DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDI1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0432-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 HI POINT BLEED DISCONNECT (PD17)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-13-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0432-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 HI POINT BLEED DISCONNECT (PDI7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-13-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0304-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0304-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PV13)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0304-11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




HELIUM TANK PRESSURE INDICATOR AND ALARMS SUPPORT PASSAGE OF
SCREEN B. REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0431-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CILREVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 0431-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS IS A DUPLICATE OF 0431-5. THIS CIL SHOULD BE
DELETED. REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0431-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
C ]






NASA FMEA #: 0431-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 11-12-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0410-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 SYSTEM DELTA-P TRANSDUCER (MT44)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0433-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 DELTA-P LINE, .25" DIA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (PV22 TO PDI7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AN INCREASE IN PRESSURE CAUSED BY THE LOSS OF INSULATION WILL BE
RELIEVED BY THE HI POINT BLEED VALVE RELIEF FEATURE.












MPS-305X BASELINE [ ]
HA NEW [ X ]
MPS
305




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 0457-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 LINE ASSEMBLY (PD2 TO RV7, CV15)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 9-18-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0405-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VLAVE (PD3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[X] *
[ ]
COSPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN OPEN IS ADDRESSED ON 0405-2.
FAILURE OF THE INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.





NASA FMEA #: 0405-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA CIL INDICATES A i/I CRITICALITY FOR ABORT. FAILURE
OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE IS COVERED ON 0405-6. FAILURE OF THE
INDICATOR WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0405-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0405-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF ii-Ii-
87.





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 0403-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, 15, 16)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0403-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, 15, 16)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ D ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE MODE IS NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
THIS FMEA/CIL SHOULD BE DROPPED.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0403-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, 15, 16)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0404-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PPI, 2, 3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0505-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV21,
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ NA] [ F ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS ADDRESSES ABORT ONLY. FAILURE OF BOTH
SERIES REDUNDANT CHECK VALVES ON A SHUTDOWN ENGINE (ABORT) AS
WELL AS ANOTHER FAILURE (i.e., MFV FAILS TO CLOSE/REMAIN CLOSED)
WILL ALLOW ULLAGE PRESSURE TO BE LOST. ABORT CRITICALITY SHOULD
BE 3/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 0505-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV21,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0504-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, 57,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0407-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0407-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0407-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE IS ADDRESSED ON 0407-6. FAILURE TO
CLOSE IS SECONDARY TO THE FAILURE OF THE POSITION INDICATOR.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0407-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE IS ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER LOSS OF POSITION
INDICATION (0407-5) AND ERRONEOUS INDICATION (0407-10).
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0402-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, 5, 6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VALVE FAILURE TO OPEN IS ADDRESSED ON 0402-5. FAILURE OF THE
VALVE AND FAILURE OF THE INDICATOR ARE BOTH REQUIRED TO CAUSE A
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.











LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, 5, 6)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0802-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, 5, 6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE ADQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER LOSS OF POSITION
INDICATION (0402-6) AND ERRONEOUS INDICATION (0402-7). THIS
ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DELETED.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0434-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 327
ITEM: LH2 FEEDLINE SCREEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-11-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0434-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 328
ITEM: LH2 FEEDLINE SCREEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-11-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0437-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS ADDRESSED ON 0437-5.
FAILURE OF THE INDICATOR, THE VALVE AND THE RELIEF VALVE ARE ALL
REQUIRED BEFORE A LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 10-5-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0437-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0437-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL OF 10-5-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0435-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF FLAME ARRESTOR (FL1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES A 1/1 CRITICALITY FOR ABORT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-21-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0435-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF FLAME ARRESTOR (FLI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-23-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0651-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ HA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES A I/i CRITICALITY FOR ABORT ONLY.
RUPTURE OF THE LINE CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING A NOMINAL
MISSION.
REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0651-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE RI/NASA ANALYSIS INDICATES A 1/1 CRITICALITY FOR ABORT ONLY.
IOA BELIEVES A 3/3 APPLIES.
REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0651-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE IS ADDRESSED ON 0651-4. FAILURE OF
THE INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT OTHER THAN A POSSIBLE
LAUNCH SCRUB.
REF: RI/NASA OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0651-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PV17)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 0651-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PVlS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE IS ADDRESSED ON 0651-4. FAILURE OF
THE INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT OTHER THAN A POSSIBLE
LAUNCH SCRUB.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0651-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PVI8)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 0423-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RELIEF LINE (FROM PV8 TO RV6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ i /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-23-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0461-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RELIEF LINE (RV6 TO FLI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-23-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0462-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RELIEF SENSE LINE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-23-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0462-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RELIEF SENSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 8-23-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0506-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 344
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (CV21 TO LV56,
CV22 TO LV57, CV23 TO LV58)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0508-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (LV56, 57, 58 TO




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.












MPS-346X BASELINE [ ]
0511-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
346
GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (PDI0 TO CVI7)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0520-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (MANIFOLD




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0521-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (LV52 TO PD5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0607-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 SENSE LINE (PD2 TO PR6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ i /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: XXXXXX
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (PD2 TO PV17)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0652-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (PVI7 TO PVlB)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0628-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (PVI8 TO OUTLET)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ _]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0515-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(AD D/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0515-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
355
LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
C ] C ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0626-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 INLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]











NASA [ 2 /!R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-361X BASELINE [ ]
0626-2 NEW [ X ]
MPS
361
LH2 ENGINE MANIFOLD PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RELIEF SYSTEM WILL PROTECT AGAINST MANIFOLD RUPTURE. NO
REDUNDANCY FOR TRANSDUCER FAILURE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0626-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GH2 OUTLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




TRANSDUCER FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. NO REDUNDANCY.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-363X BASELINE [ ]
0626-4 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS
363




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0627-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0627-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 ENGINE INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
[ ]











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-366X BASELINE [ ]
0202-3 NEW [ X ]
MPS
366
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CVI, 2, 3)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] [N]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL DEPLETE ALL 3 TANKS FOR THE AFFECTED ENGINE SYSTEM,
CAUSING THE ENGINE TO SHUT DOWN (CRIT 2). ESCAPING HELIUM MAY
OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT COMPARTMENT (CRIT i).
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0201-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HELIUM SUPPLY DISCONNECT (PD8)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0258-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 369
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
(CV25,26,36,37,41,42)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0205-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI, 2,3 ,7,8,9)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE REGULATOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO REMAIN CLOSED.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0207-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDACID: 371
ITEM: ENGINE REGULATOROUTLET CHECKVALVE
(CV5,6,7,29,40,45)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0262-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUT VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. RI/NASA CITES A LEAK AS A SECOND
FAILURE, BUT A LEAK IS A I/i FAILURE IN ISOLATION AND THUS SKEWS
THE ANALYSIS. ENGINES ARE NOT REDUNDANT.
REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0261-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT OUT CHECK VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0259-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT IN CHECK VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0202-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CV4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0631-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 376
ITEM: GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CVI0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0603-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L02 FEED MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CHECK VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0605-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 378
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CVI3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )




PRESSURIZATION IS NOT REQUIRED. DEGRADED DUMP.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 0605-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 379
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CVI3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0632-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 380
ITEM: LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CVI4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0630-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








LH2 FEED MANIFOLD NOMINAL REPRESS CHECK VALVE
W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0605-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 382
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CV24)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF REPRESS TO GH2 MANIFOLD. NO LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0605-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 383
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CV24)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0248-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS REPRESSURIZATION CHECK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




H2 LEAKAGE INOT AFT COMPARTMENT AFTER ISOLATION VALVE IS OPENED.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0238-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE (LV7, 8)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0290-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 386
ITEM: VALVE ACTUATION SOLENOIDS DOWNSTREAM OF CV9
(LV12,14,16,18,20,22,47,49,50,65,66,67,68,79,83,84,85)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0290-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 387
ITEM: VALVE ACTUATION SOLENOIDS DOWNSTREAM OF CV9
(LV12,14,16,18,20,22,47,49,50,65,66,67,68,79,83,84,85)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0291-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 388
ITEM: VALVE ACTUATION SOLENOID VALVES UPSTREAM OF CV9
(LV28,29,30,31,32,33,34,36,38,77,78)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-9-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0291-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 389
ITEM: VALVE ACTUATION SOLENOID VALVES UPSTREAM OF CV9
(LV28,29,30,31,32,33,34,36,38,77,78)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-9-
87.












NEW [ X ]
MPS
390





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:






OUTBOARD VALVE (LV43) IS 2/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 0215-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 0263-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCH LOCKING SOLENOIDS (OV65, 67)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-11-
87.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0263-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCH LOCK SOLENOID (LV65, 67)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-15-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0264-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCH UNLOCK SOLENOID (LV66, 68)




NDW/_mC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-12-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0264-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCH UNLOCK SOLENOID (LV66, 68)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-12-
87.















NEW [ X ]
MPS
398
LATCH UNLOCK SOLENOID (LV66, 68)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-12-
87.





NASA FMEA #: 0246-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESSURIZATION VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FME #: 0602-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION REGULATOR (PR5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




FAILURE OF REGULATOR FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF BOTH SOLENOID VALVES
(LV40, 41) WILL RESULT IN HELIUM INJECTION INTO THE LO2 MANIFOLD.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 2071-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ p ] [ P ] [ p ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3 TOGGLE SWITCHES. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (NO OUTPUT IN OPEN
POSITION) WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.
FEEDLINE PRESSURE RELIEF, AFTER MECO, WILL EXIST THROUGH THE
ENGINE. REFERENCE ASSESSMENT MPS-4150 (REMARKS).













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 CLOSE RPC'S. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (INADVERTENT OUTPUT) WAS
NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 DIODES. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE SHORT, CURRENT LEAKAGE)












CLOSE RPC OUTPUT DIODE











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 DIODES. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE SHORT TO GND) WAS NOT
NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS. FAILURE WILL BE
REFLECTED AS AN RPC FAIL OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 2074-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM: CLOSE HDC III




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 HDC III DRIVERS. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (CLOSE HDC III DRIVER
FAIL ON) WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2075-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 406
ITEM: CLOSE HDC I




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3 CLOSE HDC Is. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (CLOSE HDC I DRIVER FAIL
ON) WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS. FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




12 OPEN RPCs. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (L02 OPEN PREVALVE RPC
"LOSS OF OUTPUT") WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2077-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OPEN RPC OUTPUT DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN DIODES. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (ISOLATION DIODE SHORTED)
WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS. FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2077-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OPEN RPC OUTPUT DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN DIODES. THE FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE SHORTED TO GROUND)
WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS. SHORTED DIODE
WILL BE REFLECTED BY THE RPC "ON MEASUREMENT" TURNING OFF.





NASA FMEA #: 2079-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 410
ITEM: OPEN HDC I




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3 OPEN HDC Is. THE FMEA FAILURE MODE (DRIVER FAIL ON) WAS NOT
NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2180-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE
SHORTED) WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.











CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODE











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE
SHORTED) WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




9 CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE
SHORTS) WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.











OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. DIODE FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE
REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE, AND LACK OF INSTRUMENTATION. THIS
FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE SHORTS) WAS NOT NOTED DURING THE
ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 2186-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C N ] C ] [ N ]
l
-I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND
MANUAL) IN CLOSING THE L02 PREVALVE COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE SHORTS) WAS NOT NOTED
DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 2188-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND
MANUAL) IN CLOSING THE L02 PREVALVE COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE. THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE (DIODE SHORTS) WAS NOT NOTED
DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS SWITCH IS NOT USED DURING NOMINAL ASCENT.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS SWITCH IS NOT USED BY THE CREW DURING NOMINAL ASCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 2011-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 2238B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR ONE DIODE. THE BLOCKING PROTECTION OF THE
DIODE IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT.











BLOCKING DIODE, MDM TO RPC





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
423








C p ] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
424



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2397-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC A OUTPUT DIODE, 12A




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NOT ENOUGH DATA AVAILABLE TO RESOLVE SCREEN A.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2397-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC A OUTPUT DIODE, 12A




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















CRI T I CALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
427























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] C p ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PASSES SCREEN B DUE TO LO2 OUTBOARD F/D OPEN SW SCAN.
C ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
428




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















DIODE, LA1 MDM ISOLATION





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )










NASA FMEA #: 2355B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, OP SW BLOCK (MODULE)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO ELECTRICAL GROUND ON $6. NASA SCENARIO IS
INFEASIBLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2356B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, OPEN MDM ISOLATION




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 _]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-432X
2359B-I
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ANALYSIS IS POSSIBLE AND MORE CRITICAL.
[ ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
433




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PASS SCREEN B DUE TO DETECTION BY CLOSE SW SCAN.
ix]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
434




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2282-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (3A), OPEN BLOCK A (LCA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 2283-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (3A), OPEN SW BLOCK B (LCA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ _] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















DIODE'(3A), FAI MDM BLOCK





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ J [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















DIODE (3A), FA4 MDM BLOCK





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ _] [ _ ,] [ i .] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ]



















DIODE (3A), FA2 MDM BLOCK





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ _] [_ ] [ L] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]





DIODE, LAI MDM BLOCK
B. SLAUGHTER
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ,] [ ,] [ • _] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE i, CL





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE i, OP





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3, CL





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[P] C F ]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2249-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (12A), CL RPC "B" OUT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMAR_ :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2249-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (12A), CL RPC "B" OUT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
448























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE MAY NOT BE DETECTED.
[Xl
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2251-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (12A), CL XOVER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAN SHORT ALL CLOSING COMMANDS TO GROUND, PREVENTING
VALVE CLOSURE. ET SEP WITH VALVE OPEN CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.











RESISTOR OP POS SW MONITOR





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I 1 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
















RESISTOR CL POS SW MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF MONITORING. ONLY REF AVAIL: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY
8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2244-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3, OP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 HDC.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]











HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3, OP





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 HDC.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2398-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE CL RPC "C" OUT (12A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE CAN SHORT ALL CLOSE COMMANDS TO GROUND, PREVENTING
VALVE CLOSURE. MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
456




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HDC I-GND C/O CMD PWR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )










NASA FMEA #: 2031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA SCENARIO IS POSSIBLE.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2032-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HDC I-RELAY CONTROL PWR





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA DOES NOT CALL THE FIALURE OF A TRANSDUCER AND THE SWITCH TO
STANDBY TRANSDUCER A FAILURE.
















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]











[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2090-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 465
ITEM: CL HDC III
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]














NASA FMEA #: 2090-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 466
ITEM: CL HDC III




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA SCENARIO IS MORE CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2091-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 467
ITEM: CL HDC I






NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA SCENARIO IS MORE CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C
[ NA] [ HA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA SCENARIO IS MORE CRITICAL.
C ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA SCENARIO IS MORE CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2094-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CL RPC B OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]











[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )










NASA FME #: 2093-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CL RPC C OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




INSTRUMENTATION WILL DETECT THE FAILURE.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
473




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2340-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 474
ITEM: LOCK RPC (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
I OA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2340-I REV 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2340-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 475
ITEM: LOCK RPC (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2340-2 REV 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2341-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 476
ITEM: UNLOCK RPC (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2341-i REV 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2341-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 477
ITEM: UNLOCK RPC (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2341-2 REV 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2342-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 478
ITEM: LOCK HDC I




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2342-i REV 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2342-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 479
ITEM: LOCK HDC I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [,3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2342-2 REV 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2343-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 480
ITEM: UNLOCK HDC I




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2343-i REV 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.





NASA FMEA #: 2343-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 481
ITEM: UNLOCK HDC I




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2343-2 REV 10/10/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











LOCK HDC III (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















LOCK HDC III (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















UNLOCK HDC III (2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE )

























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
486
















[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















LOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 2346-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2346-3 REV 11/4/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE







[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2347-3 REV 11/19/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











LOCK RPC XOVER DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















LOCK RPC XOVER DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2348-3 REV 11/04/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











UNLOCK RPC XOVER DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

















UNLOCK RPC XOVER DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
497




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
498




[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 2351-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UNLOCK POS SW MONITOR RESISTORS (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. THE
FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
500




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2353-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC AND SOL PWR MON RESISTORS (6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5O2



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [











NASA FMEA #: 2376-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA NO 05-6J-2376-3 REV 11/04/87 CONTAINS TEXT EXPLAINING
THAT THIS ITEM FAILS SCREEN B. THIS TEXT SHOULD BE DELETED.











UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE





NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. THE
TOGGLE SWITCH IS NOT USED AT MECO.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. THE
FAILURE OF SOME BUT NOT ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS CAN BE DETECTED.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-88
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]







COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.











NASA FMEA #: 2165-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.

















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
ANALYSIS IS FOR THE ABORT CASE.
NASA'S















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.




















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




[p] IF] [p] IX]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDS FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. NASA'S
ANALYSIS IS FOR AN ABORT. THE MANUAL SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IS USED
WHEN LIMIT CONTROL IS INHIBITED AND AN ENGINE HELIUM SHUTDOWN
LIMIT VIOLATION OCCURS (I.E., ABORT CASE).





NASA FMEA #: 2171-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. NASA'S
ANALYSIS IS FOR AN ABORT. THE MANUAL SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IS USED
WHEN LIMIT CONTROL IS INHIBITED AND AN ENGINE HELIUM SHUTDOWN
LIMIT VIOLATION OCCURS (I.E., ABORT CASE).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. NASA
ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF A SINGLE WIPER WITHIN THE SWITCH. THIS IS
INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR DEFINITIONS OF THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA
ASSUMES PREMATURE CLOSURE OF THE SWITCH.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















ALL ECO SIN OPEN CMD HDC





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
C ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
627




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2227-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ALL ECO SIM DRY CMD HDC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDS FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]





ECO SIM WET CMD 1-4 HDC
B. SLAUGHTER
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
630



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
631




[ NA] [ NA]
[NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
632
LVL SENSOR SIM OPEN CMD HDC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
[ ]











LVL SENSOR SIM DRY CMD HDC





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















LVL SENSOR SIM DRY CMD HDC





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
[ ]











LVL SENSOR SIM WET CMD HDC





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
[ ]











BUS 2 AND 3 UPSTREAM HDC





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILA REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. AN
UNDERLOAD WOULD NOT OCCUR BECAUSE OF THE FIRST FAILURE. SENSORS
ARE AVAILABLE AT 100.15%, 100%, 100%, AND 99.85% AND ARE ALL
POWERED BY A SEPARATE BUS.











BUS 2 AND 3 UPSTREAM HDC





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IDA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
642
BUS 2 AND 3 DOWNSTREAM AND BUS 1 HDC
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. AN
UNDERLOAD WOULD NOT OCCUR BECAUSE OF THE FIRST FAILURE. SENSORS
ARE AVAILABLE AT 100.15%, 100%, AND 99.85% AND ARE ALL POWERED BY
A SEPARATE BUS.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
643




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2232-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 644
ITEM: BUS 4 RPC





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















[ x ] *
[ ]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
POWER PATHS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE FIRST FAILURE.










NASA FMEA #: 2232-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 645
ITEM: BUS 4 RPC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
POWER PATHS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE FIRST FAILURE.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]


















NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
POWER PATHS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE FIRST FAILURE.



















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / J t J c J c [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
[ ]
















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
C ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 2258-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2259-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2380-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















BACKUP LH2 VLV SWITCH FUSE











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. IOA CALLS
COMPUTER DUMP COMMAND REDUNDANT TO THE SWITCH DUMP COMMAND.











DUMP SEQUENCE SWITCH S1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
669



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
INSTRUMENTATION WOULD DETECT THE FAILURE.
[ ]
[ ]











BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWITCH $2











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. IOA CALLS
COMPUTER DUMP COMMAND REDUNDANT TO THE SWITCH DUMP COMMAND.











BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWITCH $2





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
672




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] ,
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
C ] C ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. PROPELLANT
VENTING DURING BOOST COULD CAUSE FIRE/EXPLOSION. SOFTWARE
INHIBITS WERE NOT CONSIDERED.











BACKUP I142 VALVE SWITCH $2











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. THE
FAILURE IS DETECTABLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2023-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. NASA
VIOLATES NTS 22206 3.3.3F.





NASA FMEA #: 2407-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 681
ITEM: METER M1 (PC)




NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. NASA
VIOLATES NTS 22206 3.3.3F.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
682
METER M2 (LO2/LH2 MANF. PRESSURE)
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. NASA
VIOLATES NTS 22206 3.3.3F.











METER M4 (HELIUM PRESSURE)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA VIOLATES NTS 22206 2.3.3F. ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA
REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2410-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA VIOLATES NTS 22206 2.3.3F. ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA
REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2018-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES REMOTE POWER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ABORT CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR AN RTLS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2019-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES RPC A OUTPUT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR AN RTLS ABORT
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2048-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 803
ITEM: LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLERS (4)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR AN RTLS ABORT
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2382-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES RPC C OUTPUT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR AN RTLS ABORT
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2383-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 805
ITEM: LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES RPC C
CROSSOVER DIODES (2)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS CRITICALITY i/I DURING AN RTLS.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2050-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES HYBRID DRIVER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITY FOR AN ABORT IS i/I.
[ ]
[ ]














-NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-807X BASELINE [ ]
2111-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
807
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2114-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK
OF HELIUM PURGE IN A SSME.





NASA FMEA #: 2115-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]














NASA FMEA #: 2117-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
811
HELIUM ISOLATION "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK
OF HELIUM PURGE IN A SSME.





NASA FMEA #: 2119-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HELIUM ISOLATION "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDNCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF
HELIUM PURGE IN A SSME.





NASA FMEA #: 2120-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK
OF HELIUM PURGE IN A SSME.














NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]














NASA FMEA #: 2301-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 815
ITEM: HDC III (2)




NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REF: EPDC/MPS FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87 AFT
PURGE AFTER A NOMINAL MISSION IS NON-CRITICAL. CRITICALITY FOR
AN ABORT IS 2/1R.





NASA FMEA #: 2301-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 816
ITEM: HDC III (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




OPENING OF ALL REDUNDANT VALVES WOULD VENT HELIUM SUPPLY.
















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITY FOR AN ABORT IS 2/IR.
[ ]
[ ]







MPS-818X BASELINE [ ]







CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF HELIUM
SUPPLY.














HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT PURGE AFTER A NOMINAL MISSION IS NON-CRITICAL.









NASA FMEA #: 2131-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE NASA SCENARIO CALLS THE LOSS OF A SECOND UNRELATED ENGINE
REDUNDANCY. THE SWITCH IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L
REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN ENGINE
SHUTDOWN.





NASA FMEA #: 2131-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HELIUM CROSSOVER VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY. THE SWITCH IS
STANDBY REDUNDANT. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/1R
FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
822
HELIUM CROSSOVER VALVE CIRCUIT HDC
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE NASA SCENARIO CALLS THE LOSS OF A SECOND UNRELATED ENGINE
REDUNDANCY. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR
FAILURES RESULTING IN AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L
REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN
ENGINE SHUTDOWN.





NASA FMEA #: 2133-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HELIUM CROSSOVER VALVE CIRCUIT BLOCKING DIODES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2311-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT FUSE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2312-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES TOGGLE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-826X BASELINE [ ]
2313-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
826
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: N/A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT MDM OA3





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2310-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-829X BASELINE [ ]
2064-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
829




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2065-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT HDC III (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA # : N/A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT MONITOR MDM





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]












NASA FMEA #: 2135-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURES COULD LEAD TO GROUNDING OF THE OPEN POWER SOLENOID.





NASA FMEA #: 2141-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA CALLS LOSS OF AN UNRELATED ENGINE A REDUNDANT FAILURE. NSTS
22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES RESULTING
IN AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-88.











HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I (6)









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA ASSUMES A HELIUM LEAK WHICH IS CRITICALITY I/i BY ITSELF TO
GET THEIR IR.





NASA FMEA #: 2143-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA ASSUMES A HELIUM LEAK WHICH IS CRITICALITY 1/1 BY ITSELF TO
GET THEIR IR.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE NASA SCENARIO CAUSES THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF
MISSION). THE SHORT TO GROUND WILL BE DETECTED. NSTS 22206
2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN
ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE COULD RESULT IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST.
THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L
REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN ENGINE
SHUTDOWN.

















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















MPS-901X BASELINE [ ]
0602-5 NEW [ X ]
MPS
901
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS REGULATOR (PR5)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REGULATOR WILL REMAIN OPEN, PRESSURIZING THE MANIFOLD. FAILURE
OF RELIEF SYSTEM DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE MANIFOLD RUPTURE. NO
HAZARD DURING DUMP PRESSURIZATION.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0629-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION REGULATOR (PR6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THREE FAILURES MUST OCCUR BEFORE HELIUM WILL BE INJECTED INTO THE
LH2 MANIFOLD. NO EFFECT PRE-MECO. FAILURE OF RELIEF SYSTEM
(FOUR FAILURES TOTAL) DURING ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS CAN CAUSE
MANIFOLD OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE.





NASA FMEA #: 0251-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0247-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS REPRESSURIZTION ORIFICE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0145-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER (FL5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ I /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0253-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM LINE (CV25,26,36,37,41,42 TO




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0254-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY LINE (LVI,2,3,4 TO




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0111-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY LINE (PRI,2,3,7,8,9 TO




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0235-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY LINE (CV5,6,7,29,40,45 TO




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0115-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HELIUM INTERCONNECT IN LINE (LV59,61,63 TO




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HAZARD EXISTS WHEN INTERCONNECT IN VALVES ARE OPEN (MECO TO
MECO+20 SEC). AT ALL OTHER TIMES, THIS FAILURE IS 2/1R.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0116-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HELIUM INTERCONNECT OUT LINE (LV60,62,64 TO




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HAZARD EXISTS WHEN INTERCONNECT OUT VALVES ARE OPEN (MECO+20
SEC). WHEN THE VALVES ARE CLOSED, THIS FAILURE IS 2/IR.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.













NEW [ X ]
MPS
912
HELIUM METALLIC BOSS SEALS (K SEALS)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ I /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 10-15-
87.













NEW [ X ]
MPS
913
NAFLEX HELIUM TANK SEALS (FOR TK4)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOa [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0706-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMBINATION HELIUM TANK SEALS (FOR TK6, 8, i0)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NAJ [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 0626-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE ARE FOUR PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS THAT ALL SHOULD INDICATE THE
SAME PRESSURE DURING FILL. FAILURE OF ALL FOUR CAN CAUSE TANK
UNDERFILL AND LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ASCENT. FAILURE OF
INDICTOR(S) DURING ASCENT WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0626-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FOUR PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS (INCLUDES ENGINE TRANSDUCERS) ALL
SHOULD INDICATE THE SAME PRESSURE DURING TANK FILL. FAILURE OF
ALL FOUR CAN CAUSE TANK UNDERFILL AND LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING
ASCENT. FAILURE OF INDICATOR(S) DURING ASCENT WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0626-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ENGINE HELIUM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. NO REDUNDANCY. A
LEAK IS NOT A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0626-11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PNEUMATIC HELIUM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. NO REDUNDANCY. A
LEAK IS NOT A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0626-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HELIUM ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




TRANSDUCER FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. NO REDUNDANCY.




RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING





NASA FMEA #: 0627-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCERS (6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MULTIPLE FAILURE OF TRANSDUCERS MAY ALLOW STRUCTURAL TEMPERATURE
LIMITS TO BE VIOLATED DURING TANK FILL AND CAUSE RUPTURE AND LOSS
OF VEHICLE. FAILURE DURING ASCENT WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0627-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REF: RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 0409-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT (PDI4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND/OR SHARPNEL DAMAGE.
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0426-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 923
ITEM: GN2 PURGE LINE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING
NOTES.





NASA FMEA #: 0901-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NSTS 22206 2.3.1 DOES NOT REQUIRE A FMEA FOR STRUCTURE.
0901-1.
DELETE





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH MPS-1005, WHICH IS THE
WORST CASE FOR THIS FAILURE MODE. MPS-1005 MATCHES AND AGREES
WITH 0514-1. THE VEHICLE'S ACCELERATION HAS A MUCH LARGER EFFECT
ON THE L02 NET POSITIVE SUCTION PRESSURE (NPSP) THAN THE
ULLAGE PRESSURE DOES. THEREFORE, NEITHER CAVITATION AT THE LPOT
NOR LOSS OF LO2 IS VALID. HOWEVER, THE LOSS OF GO2 ULLAGE
PRESSURE CAUSES AN OPPOSITE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL THAN WHAT THE
LO2 TANK WAS DESIGNED FOR. THIS COULD CAUSE THE LO2 TANK TO
BUCKLE DUE TO AERODYNAMIC LOADS ON A TANK WHICH IS NOT
PRESSURIZED. THERE ARE 3 SUCH CHECK VALVES.





NASA FMEA #: 0514-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ /NA ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA CRITICALITY FOR AN ABORT WAS ORIGINALLY REPORTED AS A i/I
DUE TO ULLAGE PRESSURE LOST THROUGH A SHUTDOWN ENGINE. THE MAIN
OXIDIZER VALVE, WHICH IS CLOSED DURING AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN, ADDS 2
LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY TO THIS FAILURE MODE. THE LOSS
OF LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE COULD CAUSE A PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL
BETWEEN THE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE TANK THAT THE TANK WAS NOT
DESIGNED TO HOLD. THE RESULTANT LACK OF PRESSURE IN THE TANK
COULD CAUSE THE TANK TO BUCKLER DUE TO THE ATMOSPHERE FORCES.
NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE NASA/RI CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OF
12-23-87.





NASA FMEA # : 0514-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVlS, 19,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE RI/NASA CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OF
12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: 0514-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19 20)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE HEAT EXCHANGER IN THE SSME IS DESIGNED TO HANDLE 02 AT ABOUT
3700 PSIA. HELIUM LEAKING INTO THE HEAT EXCHANGER AT 20 PSIA
WOULD NOT HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT. THEREFORE, IT IS 3/3.
NASA INFORMATION IS BASED ON NASA FMEA/CIL REVIEW MEETING NOTES
(REF. J. BORCHES).





NASA FMEA #: 0514-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF THE CHECK VALVE TO OPEN WILL ALOOW INCREASING GO2
PRESSURE TO RUPTURE THE HEAT EXCHANGER, POSSIBLY RESULTING IN
ENGINE EXPLOSION. NASA/RI INFORMATION IS TAKEN FROM THE RI/NASA
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OF 12-23-87.





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19,
K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE BURNING OF THIS VALVE COULD CAUSE A HOLE WHICH WOULD ALLOW
HOT GO2 TO ENTER THE AFT COMPARTMENT. THIS WOULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND A POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION.




MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY-
ENGINEERING SERVICES
16055 SPACE CENTER BLVD, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77062
